In CENT area, the time required was greater. For future planning of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, time given to this operation should probably be an hour with a safety factor to allow for delays due to weather. The control vessels took charge of the assault LCVP's and LCA's at the transport rendezvous areas and escorted them to the designated respective lines of departure. From there, assault boat waves, as directed, proceeded on schedule to their assigned beaches, unloaded troops, retracted as soon as possible, and returned to make a follow-up troop carry as ordered.
A distinctive characteristic of the initial attack was the manner in which an order, contained in the basic plan, was carried out. The basic plan expressly directed all forces to "Extend the timing of assault waves to avoid congestion on beaches. H hour was planned for The first DIME wave arrived at their beaches about on schedule. Fires at inland targets, started by bombing prior to H hour, aided considerably in identifying the beaches.
Initial opposition at Red and Green beaches was light; at Yellow it was heavy; on Blue beaches, light; and over Red 2 and Green 2, opposition was fairly heavy. The surf at the beaches was about three feet high, and together with a strong current and Force 4 Westerly winds, many landing craft coxswains were in serious difficulty with craft broaching on the beaches.
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The landings were generally unopposed, due to the pre-assault Cruiser and Destroyer shore bombardment. The th Regimental Combat Team landed on its assigned beaches, pushed promptly inland, and captured the designated initial objectives ahead of schedule. The th Regimental Combat Team, in general, landed on the correct beaches, but experienced delay in movement through the dune area immediately inland because of extensive mine fields.
The th Regimental Combat Team gained its assigned D day objectives after completing a successful landing. The fact that this landing was not made on the correct beaches did cause some delay in marching and forming up. In the JOSS area, initial attack waves, with a delay caused by bad weather, landed according to plan. All of the landings went forward successfully, and in spite of enemy counterfire on some beaches, and poor weather, Army forces were landed over the correct beaches according to the planned time-interval schedule.
Although the attack groups anchored between H minutes and H minutes, it is believed that they were at a greater distance from the beach than the scheduled three and a half miles; thus, the assault LCVP's were required to make a considerable longer run than had been planned. The H. It was through their expert navigation This was supplemented by the scout boats at Yellow and Green beaches.
Assault boat waves, especially at beaches where due to causes beyond their control it had not been possible to keep to the scheduled H hour, managed to avoid congestion on beaches during the immediate assault by maintaining an adequate time spacing between waves. For future amphibious campaigns, where operationally practicable, some degree of flexibility in executing H hour requirements may be found desirable.
In the event that the planned H hour cannot possibly be attained, it may become necessary to set a new H hour thereby altering the time, but not the relative schedule, of pre-assault naval gunfire and arrival of the initial assault boat waves at designated beaches. It may be found feasible to fire some form of aerial rocket or combination of rockets from the vicinity of the Task Force Flagship as a signal to indicate the new H or H minute time reference point to that Task Force.
Immediate confirmation of this change by every means available would be an absolute requirement. Available methods of increasing the splendid degree of coordination of naval gunfire with the arrival of assault boat waves should be thoroughly investigated and tested in order to provide the utmost possible protection to the attacking forces. At CENT destroyers were employed to cover and support the landing. Preparatory fire was opened at about H Each fire support destroyer was assigned an area of responsibility which was well covered by 5" projectiles.
The fire was lifted just before the first wave landed. The effect of this close supporting fire was apparent as the 45th Division landed practically unopposed and was able to proceed with the establishment of its beachhead faster than planned. Pre-assault naval gunfire, where used, on pre-arranged targets and beaches, was extremely effective in destroying enemy beach defenses and constituted a definite factor in reducing the number of causalities and the amount of landing craft damage from enemy local action at the beach landing and unloading points.
It is evident that the clearance and neutralization of beach defenses by naval gunfire is most vital to the success of the initial assault. Naval gunfire can efficiently aid in preventing enemy action from pinning the initial troop waves to the beaches on which they have landed. The CENT force landed initially on a very broad front and its stores, ammunition, and supplies were distributed initially along several miles of sandy beaches. Exits from these beaches were infrequent, difficult, and mined. Retraction was satisfactory, but breaking surf on outer bar caused a few LCVP's to broach.
Several boats were lost on rocks off beaches Green 2 and Yellow 2 and casualties were sustained. Salvage was handicapped by shoal water where tugs could not operate. In some eight out of 16 cases the LCI L 's used for the reserve battalions of the RCTs were able to beach far enough to permit safe debarkation of troops direct to land. In the other cases resort was had to auxiliary craft such as rubber boats and LCVP's for debarkation. As vehicles began to use the beaches, it was discovered that they were heavily mined, and bulldozers, DUKWs, and other vehicles were lost.
The narrow rocky entrance, the cross sea from NW, and the shallowness of the beach made it impossible to retract or to render assistance to those beached until succeeding waves had landed. Most of these boats were not broached but merely stuck in the sand.
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LST's had great difficulty unloading at Red beach due to the poor gradient and soft sand. On D day, due to the narrow approaches, LCT's were sent in five at a time to the right flank of Red beach. To ensure the success of the seaborne assaults, it will be necessary first to neutralize the beach defenses. Naval bombardment.
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Air bombardment. Action by airborne troops. The primary role of the air forces will be the destruction of enemy air power and therefore b will not be available. Therefore it is essential that airborne troops be used to soften the defenses against which seaborne assaults will be made. This role is of greater importance than the early capture of the airfields.
Airborne troops are necessary to neutralize the beach defenses , and their maximum employment is required. Seaborne assaults should take place some two hours before first light. Airborne troops should be landed preferably in the dark or at dusk in sufficient time and at such a place as to be able to complete their task before the seaborne assault takes place. To allow the airborne troops to make some use of some moon and to afford the approach to the coastline the cover of darkness, D day should be about 10 July, when the moon is in its second quarter".
From the above, the following repetitions are made for the purpose of further comment: "To ensure success of the seaborne assaults, it will be necessary first to neutralize the beach defenses Under the Force plan the paratroops were directed to inland objectives in a direction away from the "beach defenses against which seaborne assaults will be made. This phase of the moon was unsuitable from the viewpoint of discovery of the approaching sea forces. None of these agencies had a complete and authoritative plan of what was to be loaded or where. The Transport Quartermasters' problems were made insurmountable as various units of organizations such as the Chemical Warfare Service, Signal Corps, Ordnance, Engineers, and other activities descended upon the ships to obtain space therein for their special equipment, no record of which was in the possession of the TQMs.
During the loading of the ships many changes were made in the military loading plans; this seriously delayed the formulation and distribution of the Boat Employment Plans of the Transport Division Commanders. Several derangements of cargo handling gear occurred. The sea condition were most unfavorable in the CENT area and this factor, more than any other, contributed to the delay of the H hour in that force. Some ships reported that delays were introduced in loading the assault wave boats by the removal of slings from vehicles.
This could have been eliminated by providing sufficient slings for each assault loaded vehicle, leaving the sling in the boat when the vehicle is lowered to the boat. A shortage of nets developed in some ships; each APA, XAP and AKA should be provided with 30 extra nets, thus permitting the nets to be left in the boats until the return of the boats from the beach. Where this occurred ships placed working parties of bluejackets, taken from the ships' gun crews or engineers force, and sent them in with the boats to unload them; in the future at least 2 soldiers should be placed in each LCVP to help in unloading at the beach.
Other boats, when ordered from congested beaches, ran along the shoreline until a suitable clear spot could be found where the boat was beached and unloaded. This, of course, resulted in some equipment and stores being landed in the wrong area. Due to the complete stoppage of all unloading for many hours caused by beach congestion, the actual time during which unloading operations were underway was less than the figures given herein. With vessels loaded only with essential assault weapons, equipment, and stores, in precise conformity with the standard procedure governing combat-loading, and discharging over properly organized beaches, it is estimated, neglecting enemy action, that a military force of two reinforced infantry divisions can be firmly placed ashore in 48 hours.
In meeting the above requirements new construction had to be held to a minimum due to shortages time, labor and material. This operation tested the seagoing qualities of the craft severely and recommendations concerning strengthening of these hulls appear herein under "Material and Logistics.
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As boats continued to arrive on the beaches and awaited unloading by the Shore Party, the boats were soon swamped or stranded. Eventually the beaches became crowded with miscellaneous personnel standing around idle.
In the absence of properly marked staging areas, troops were observed loitering about on the sand dunes awaiting instructions as to movement. Many boats retracted from the regular beaches and moved to the flanks where a clear beach space could be found, and there the boat crews unloaded their own boats. This led to scattering of Army equipment and stores, in some cases placing material on the beaches of adjacent divisions, thus rendering more difficult the task of supplying the advancing troops.
Other boats, unable to obtain shore party personnel to unload them at assigned beaches, returned to their transports still loaded. This resulted in many ship commands taking men from gun crews and engineers force and placing them in the boats as working parties in order to unload boats on the beaches. Finally, the unloading situation became so critical that transports organized working parties from each ship and sent these parties ashore to unload boats and craft.
Such parties varied in size from 40 to officers and men. On some beaches these naval working parties were augmented by gangs of Prisoners of War which engaged voluntarily in this labor. In this manner were the combat-loaders and landing craft finally unloaded during the assault phase. This condition sets in at the critical period of a landing operation from about noon on D day to the night of D plus one.
It is during this period when our troops have reached inland objectives and are well-engaged with the enemy, when the demands from our troops for ammunition and particular weapons and equipment is greatest, and when we are probably inferior to the enemy in artillery and possibly in infantry, providing he has carried out reconnaissance and has moved his reserves. He will exploit his air power on D day to the utmost and the beaches are the most favorable target the enemy can, and does, select.
But it is at this critical period that boat crews and Shore Parties lag, when the beaches become congested, and when there is a grave danger of complete breakdown in the supply system. Shore Party personnel became scattered over a long stretch of coast where they were left to shift for themselves; the lateral movement to and fro along the beaches caused the cessation of unloading until parties rejoined and reorganized at the new sites in some cases this did not transpire until the following day.
Discipline, leadership, and control were absent. LSTs standing in to beaches to land received numerous conflicting orders, and these ships were required to move several times before they were allowed to unload at any specific beach. As pontoon causeways were shifted, no information was transmitted to the Commander of the LST group, and no effort to coordinate activities was displayed. This condition was forestalled in the JOSS area where CTF 86 placed three Group Commanders from landing craft organization ashore as Head Beachmasters and thus reduced the beaches and, boat control to order.
Much of these authorities is obsolete; the introduction of the air arm has brought with it further complications in command relationships. It would be helpful, however, if there existed a more thorough understanding that the Naval Commander has responsibility for the operation until the Landing Force is firmly established on shore, and that with him rests the authority commensurate with the responsibility.
Thus early in the planning stage of the Sicilian campaign it was recognized that lethal balloons were essential to the protection of the assault shipping and the assault beaches of the Western Task Forces. The above assignments should be temporary so that the specialized services of these officers may be utilized in each succeeding operation for which they are qualified.